We construct price indexes for motor vehicles for recent years using a unique dataset collected from a large national sample of motor vehicle dealerships. Given a wealth of information on both actual transaction prices and quantities in this dataset, we are able to estimate price measures within a matched-model framework. The resulting indexes illustrate an interesting pattern in which vehicle prices drop significantly as they near the end of their model-year life cycle, in large part through the use of marketing incentives. To examine why vehicle prices behave in this way, we also estimate constant-quality price changes using a hedonic regression. After controlling for the vehicle's fixed characteristics, we find that the value of a vehicle declines the longer it sits on the dealer's lot. We also test whether prices decline over the model year as the novelty of a newly introduced vehicle wears off, though we find little evidence that this has much of an effect.
Introduction
Although motor vehicle manufacturers have used various types of incentives to boost consumer sales for some time, incentives in recent years appear to have become both more generous and more widespread. We construct monthly price indexes for motor vehicles from 1999 to 2003 using a unique dataset collected from a large national sample of motor vehicle dealerships that contains information on both actual transaction prices and quantities. Given such a wealth of data, we are able to estimate monthly price measures within a matched-model framework, and to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to examine the within-year pattern of prices using such detailed information. The resulting indexes illustrate an interesting pattern in which vehicle prices drop significantly over the course of their model-year life cycle, in large part through the use of marketing incentives.
Vehicle prices may trend lower over the model year because of changes in dealers' costs.
However, when we construct matched-model price indexes of dealer cost, we find that they are relatively stable over the four-year sample period, and they decline less than retail prices over the course of the model year do. We therefore conclude that it is movements in markups that account for most of the variation in prices.
Working on the assumption that the model-year price declines are demand driven, we then attempt to test two possible explanations for the observed pattern. In the first, motor vehicles prices behave like those of seasonal commodities, and prices are high initially because of the newness of the vehicles and the prestige associated with owning one. An alternative hypothesis is that as new vehicles sit on dealer lots they are subject to depreciation, in part because of the anticipated appearance of new and better vehicles each model year. Whether the model-year price declines are driven by seasonal or depreciation effects has implications for how these prices are measured. If seasonal, then chaining the month-to-month price changes is inappropriate, and we should look only at year-over-year changes in vehicle prices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we provide an overview of the behavior of marketing incentives over the past four years and describe the data that we obtained from J.D. Power and Associates. In section 3 we present several matched-model price indexes and review their implications. Sections 4 and 5 contain the results of the hedonic price nominal value of cash rebates in a period divided by the total number of sales in that particular period. The top panel also shows the average present discounted value of reduced-rate financing, which is referred to as interest rate subvention. The interest subvention plotted in chart 1 was constructed by J. D. Power and Associates. In constructing the measure, buyers are presumed to have received a subsidized interest rate if the interest rate on their purchase is below a set rate of 6 or 7 percent (depending on the time period). 1 These are assumed to be the rates that the individual would have received at a commercial bank or some other independent source of financing.
As seen in the chart, the two types of incentives have grown in value significantly in recent years. After changing little on balance from early 1998 through most of 2001, interest subvention shot up in October 2001. Following the attacks of September 11, General Motors announced a program that offered purchasers either zero percent financing for up to 60 months or a cash rebate. This proved to be immensely popular. In response, most other motor vehicle manufacturers also offered zero percent financing or boosted their incentive programs.
Over recent years, cash rebates have steadily moved higher, but they plummeted at the end of 2001 as interest subvention soared. Indeed, the two series often move inversely. For most vehicles, consumers may choose either the cash rebate or the special reduced-interest incentive but not both. However, it is possible for a consumer to take the rebate and still get a below-bank rate from an auto finance company, which would still be captured as interest subvention. In general, financing incentives have been more generous than cash rebates.
The bottom panel of chart 1 shows two measures of how widely used the incentives have 2 As mentioned previously, buyers may accept the cash rebate and still receive a below market finance rate, although not the special rate offered in the incentive program. 3 Using the buyer's address recorded in the dealers' F&I system, J. D. Power has also linked observations in PIN with 1990 Census track data, which provides further information on education, ethnicity, income, family size, and profession. were dropped because of an insufficient number of observations on sales, or the model was missing a significant number of observations in some other series that we used. In addition, days-to-turn was truncated for some models to avoid distorting estimates in our hedonic regressions. For several models, the days-to-turn series had a few observations appear following several months of no observations. Sometimes these dangling observations appeared 2-1/2 years after the model was introduced. This likely reflected dealer swaps wherein a dealer agrees to take a vehicle (usually a less desirable one) in exchange for obtaining a desired vehicle from another dealership. 6 The PIN system classifies transactions at an even more detailed level, a level that PIN terms "trim-level." We have done some experimentation with these data, and have found that working at this level roughly doubles the size of the database while not materially changing results. 5 for a total of 21,234 observations. 5 Table 1B provides examples of the model-level detail as well as our nomenclature. These data are incredibly rich. For example, although we generally refer to the various observations as model-level data, for many vehicles the observations are at a more detailed level, what is commonly referred to as "trim level." For example, we include in our sample the model, Buick LeSabre. The trim level appellation is Buick LeSabre Limited.
However, for some models in our sample (for example, the Mercedes ML320 or the BMW 325XI in table 1B), no further level of detail is available. Thus, our sample includes these models at essentially the trim level. We believe that our unit of observation, vehicles by model and model year, is at a sufficiently detailed level to accurately estimate the matched-model price indexes. 6 Table 2 shows the number of models by model year. All told, we have observations on 420 models. We also collected information on the number of vehicles that are completely new to the market as well as the number that have received a major redesigns. Since 1998, for each model year (with the exception of 2003), the number of models in our database has grown steadily. Our dataset is thus capturing an important development in vehicle markets during this period, when manufacturers were rapidly expanding the number models in an attempt to fill various "niches" in the market. This assumption is supported by data from Ward's Communications (chart 2 and table 2), which also shows the number of unique models rising over time. Table 3 summarizes other variables in our dataset. The average vehicle price before incentives in the sample is $30,460. This is above the implied average price for automobiles and 7 This rate appears monthly in the Federal Reserve Board Consumer Credit release (G.19). 8 The CPI no longer includes the line item, "automobile finance charges" that was separate from the index for new vehicles. One could argue that interest subvention should not affect new vehicle prices, 6 light trucks of about $22,000 used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in the NIPA accounts. However, the median vehicle price in our dataset is a little over $25,000, which is closer to the NIPA average. Vehicle price less cash rebate (line 2) is a concept closest to what the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) attempts to measure in the CPI for new motor vehicles. In general, customers are given a choice of either cash back or a reduced-rate financing when purchasing a vehicle.
When this occurs, the BLS incorporates the value of the cash rebate into the price of the vehicle regardless of what the buyer actually chose.
Cash rebates (line 4) by model and model year were taken directly from the PIN database and the mean is the difference between the series in lines 1 and 2. However, we constructed model-level estimates of the value of discounted financing, commonly referred to as "subvention," so that we could develop price measures that capture the full effects of the discounts and incentives offered to consumers during our period of study. This was accomplished as follows: First, for each monthly observation by model and model year we calculated the present discounted value of loan payments using available data on the average amount financed, the average loan term, and the average interest rate paid. We then constructed the discounted value of what the loan payments would have been had consumers instead paid the average auto finance rate charged by commercial banks for a 48 month loan (a time series published by the Federal Reserve). 7 The value of subvention was then defined as the difference between these two estimates. Although the bank rate varies more over time than the fixed assumptions used by the J.D. Power series (chart 1), it does not vary by model. Thus, it assumes that all buyers in a given period carry the same risk.
As shown in table 3, the average value of interest subvention ($870) in recent years has exceeded the value of cash rebates ($520). If one believes that the value of all consumer incentives should be reflected in any measure of new vehicle prices, then the CPI as currently constructed has likely overstated consumer prices. 8 In contrast, the PPI, as a measure of the but should reduce overall consumer prices (Lebow, 2001) . However, currently the overall CPI does not reflect the value of new motor vehicle interest subvention. 7 price received by the manufacturer net of any discounts, reflects the value of both cash rebates and interest subvention. Our series, price less cash rebates and subvention (line 3 of table 3) is the price series closest to the PPI concept.
Vehicle cost (line 6) measures the cost of the vehicle at the time of sale. It includes transportation charges and the cost of dealer add-ons such as roof racks and paint sealants.
Ideally, vehicle cost would only include the cost of manufacturing and transporting the vehicle to the dealership. However, our cost measure also includes the value of factory-to-dealer cash incentives and dealer advertising allowances.
Days-to-turn (line 7) captures the number of days that a vehicle is on a dealer's lot. For example, if the dealer obtained a new vehicle on September 1 and sold it on September 15, daysto-turn would equal 15. Days-to-turn can be affected by overall vehicle demand. In addition, it also tends to lengthen as a vehicle comes to the end of the its model life and new model-year vehicles appear on dealers lots. The median number of days-to-turn in the sample is 53; however, for 438 observations, or 2 percent of the sample, days-to-turn is greater than a year.
Days-to-turn is less than 5 days for one percent of the sample (225 observations); this seems plausible given that vehicles are often ordered by consumers who want a particular color or trim combination.
Matched-Model Indexes
The J.D. Power monthly model-level data contain a nontrivial set of "matched" observations from one period to the next (table 4) . As a result, an aggregate price index can be compiled by successively applying a superlative index number formula to those items for which prices are observed in adjacent periods. The result is a form of matched-model index. We calculate matched-model price indexes using three formulations, the Tornqvist, the Fisher, and a geometric mean. The matched-model Tornqvist price index, for example, is a weighted geometric mean of price ratios in two periods using an average of each item's revenue share in the two periods as weights. In logs the aggregate price, P MT , from t-1 to t is expressed as
Summation over matched models is denoted as j m0Mt/t-1 , where the number of homogeneous varieties produced or sold in each period is given by M t , and the number produced or sold in adjacent periods is M t/t-1 , (that is, M t 1 M t-1 ). When the results of (1), as well as results using the closely related Fisher formula, are chained together over T periods, the price index will be exact for periods before and after changes in the composition of M t/t-1 (Diewert 1987) .
The geometric mean indexes we calculate use (1) with s m,t replaced by 1/M t/t-1 . Of course, if prices of all items being aggregated move in pretty much the same proportions, as one might expect if the items are close substitutes (different brands of essentially the same sport utility vehicles, for example), then this aggregation formula will produce pretty much the same result as a weighted, or superlative, formulation (Abraham, Greenlees, and Moulton 1998) .
Chart 3 shows matched-model Fisher price indexes for the three price concepts discussed earlier. As may be seen, the inclusion and treatment of incentives in the underlying price data has noticeable effects on the aggregate results. The broadest measure (the blue line) posts a cumulative decline of more than 20 percent for the period shown, an annual average drop of about 5-1/2 percent. By contrast, the index calculated using prices before customer cash rebates (the black line) falls just more than 10 percent, a 2-3/4 percent average decline per year over the period shown. The effect of the sharp increase in the value and incidence of interest subvention alone shows through in the difference between the broadest measure and the measure that just excludes customer cash rebates (the red lines). Note that these price indexes diverge noticeably only for the very recent period, that is, beginning in 2001.
The underlying quantity data used for weighting all indexes in chart 3 are the actual quantities sold per period, and the post-2000 results suggest that these magnitudes have also been affected by the average size, prevalence, and type of incentive on each vehicle. When
General Motors offered zero interest finance rates on their makes in the wake of 9/11, consumer expenditure patterns shifted toward these models. When these expenditure patterns are applied to price measures that do not include interest subvention, the aggregate matched-model price indexes post a temporary increase. Table 5 provides a summary comparison of the matched-model price indexes using the Fisher (the indexes charted), Tornqvist, and geometric mean formulas. For the indexes of prices before cash rebates and of prices after cash rebates, the weighted formulas fall noticeably more slowly than the indexes that use the geometric mean formulation. However, the results for index formulations for prices after cash rebates and interest subvention are not materially different from one another, suggesting that price movements for vehicles that are close substitutes to one another are highly similar once interest subvention is taken into account.
Returning to chart 3, note that all matched-models measures fall appreciably faster than BLS's official measure, which raises a number of questions. It's obviously difficult for us to answer specific questions about BLS's prices, but we do know that, in addition to having very detailed information on cash and financing incentives, the J.D. Power PIN dataset that we are using differs from that of the BLS in that our data include monthly observations on quantities and well as prices. As suggested by table 4, we often simultaneously observe selling prices for a given model vehicle in a given model year with those for the same vehicle in an adjacent model
year. As a result, we are able to include the price change for each model-year vehicle, where the change for each year is included in the index with the appropriate quantity weights.
Rather than comparing our results with official data, therefore, what we would like to stress is that the dataset we are using differs from those that have been used in earlier studies of motor vehicle prices in that we have monthly data; for example, Court (1939) , Griliches (1971) , Berry, Levinson and Pakes (1995) , and Raff and Trajtenberg (1997) all used annual or model-
year data. We are thus able to look at the intra-year pattern of vehicle price change, which raises a number of interesting questions about the determinants of prices for durable goods that undergo frequent and/or recurring upgrades, changes, and redesigns. September) is about 2 percent, which is 2 percentage points less than the drop in the comparable retail price.
All told, these results suggest that only a very small portion of the drop in consumer vehicle prices over the model year stems from underlying producer costs. With regard to the 9 By "conventional" index number formula, we (following Diewert) are referring to a superlative index number that treats models at the close of one season and models at the beginning of another as separate items in (1).
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price measure that excludes cash rebates, about one-half of the downward trend in consumer prices stems from the incentives, and, by implication, the remainder of the intra-year variation is accounted for by dealer markups.
The accuracy of the price measures shown in chart 3 and should be treated as "weakly seasonal" commodities (Dard 1998 (Dard , 2003 . 
Hedonic Regressions
The typical hedonic regression expresses the prices of varieties of a good in terms of the quantities of characteristics contained in each variety in the period and dummy variables in time.
When there are nontrivial sets of overlapping varieties from one period to the next, and the data are organized so that each model represents a homogeneous variety, and the coefficients on each characteristic are allowed to vary by model, the hedonic regression can be expressed as a fixedeffects model (Aizcorbe, Corrado, and Doms 2000) . Each unique model (m = 1, ... N) can be assigned a dummy variable that captures the average value of its unique characteristics on its price.
Our data conform to these demands of the fixed-effects model, and as a proxy for measurements on the (fixed) physical characteristics of each vehicle, we define and use a dummy variable for each model-year vehicle in the sample, i.e., "2001 Honda Accord." Over the four-year sample period there are 1,650 such combinations of models and model years and a total of 21,234 observations. 10 Because the characteristics of a vehicle are fixed over its selling cycle, and because each model of vehicle has many observations, these dummy variables account for much of the cross-sectional variation in prices while allowing for the "brand effects,"
or model-specific values for coefficients on characteristics, that many researchers have found important in empirical work using the hedonic technique.
The presence and significance of within-year effects is explored by using measurements (Z) that vary by month and by model. The hedonic regressions we estimate thus use the following semi-logarithmic form:
where MD m,t = 1 if the price is for model m, and = 0 otherwise. Table 6 reports the cumulative price declines as well as the average annual price change.
In the baseline regression, the price before incentives drops 17.5 percent, while the indexes of prices after incentives drop between 20 and 22 percent. In all three cases, the estimated declines are comparable to the results of the geometric mean matched-model index.
Given these baseline results, we then examined the importance of several additional vehicle characteristics to see if they would significantly alter the results of the price regression.
Specifically, we tested two hypotheses: The first is based on a stylized fact reported by many observers that newly introduced models or newly redesigned models seem to fetch higher prices than comparable models that existed in previous model years. This could be because consumers value the "newness" of a vehicle, or they associate some sort of prestige with being the first one The results of adding these variables to the baseline regression are shown in table 6.
As can be seen in the table, the indexes based on a regression with the newness dummy added to 11 For example, a popular car-shopping website lists instructions on how to determine the date a vehicle was produced from its vehicle identification number (VIN). Any consumer can therefore look at the VIN to figure out the age of a given vehicle. 12 We also included days-to-turn squared in the set of independent variables; its coefficient was statistically significant but small. 13 We also tried adding a measure of "model age" to the regression, where model age is defined as the time that has elapsed (in months) since the first sale of a model-year vehicle (2001 Honda Accord) . However, the results were totally implausible; we believe this reflects a problem of collinearity. By construction, the model age variable implicitly assumes that all vehicles of a particular model and year were produced at the same time, i.e., in the first month they were sold. But since firms tend to cluster the 14 the right-hand side are little different from the baseline regressions. The coefficient on the newness dummy variable was not significant in two out of the three regressions. For the regression of prices after cash rebates and incentives, the coefficient was positive and significant at the 95 percent confidence level; however, with an average annual price decline of 5.4 percent, as compared with the 5.6 percent decrease in the baseline index, quantitatively the newness variable had only a very small effect on the overall pattern of prices. All told, these results do not provide much support for the seasonal argument based on the "newness" of a vehicle.
A second hypotheses we tested is the idea that as vehicles sit on dealer lots they are subject to depreciation during the period of time before the vehicle is actually purchased.
Although these are still new vehicles (based on their mileage), they become less valuable to consumers because they are closer to being considered used vehicles. Moreover, as the end of a model year approaches, consumers know that the next model-year vehicles will soon be available, so they are likely to place a lower value on the existing models. 11 Another reason consumers might pay less for older "new" vehicles is that there may be a perception that vehicles that have been sitting on dealer lots for some time are lemons.
In order to examine the importance of this "depreciation effect," we included the days-toturn variable, which as we said is a measure of a vehicle's age in inventory. The results in table 6 affirm that the days-to-turn measure does indeed have a significant effect on the vehicle's transaction price. In all three price regressions, the estimated coefficients on days-to-turn are significant with t statistics of at least 7.0. 12 As expected, the signs on the coefficients are negative, ranging between -0.01 and -0.02 percent per day; this implies that, all else equal, a car that has been on the lot for 100 days will sell at a price 1 to 2 percent lower than one that has just arrived at the dealership. 13 introduction of new model-year vehicles in the third quarter, all vehicles of a given model year have a similar age. Hence, there is too little variation in model age, and the variable is (nearly) perfectly correlated with the time and model-year dummy variables. By contrast, the days-to-turn measure captures the fact that there is cross-sectional variation in the age of vehicles for a given model year; in addition, days-to-turn provides additional information because it is measured in days, not just months.
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Chart 8 illustrates that the price indexes implied by the regression with days-to-turn are quite a bit different than the baseline indexes. The price after cash rebate falls by a total of 13.6 percent over the four-year sample period, much less than the 22.1 percent drop in the baseline index. The decline in the price after cash rebates and interest subvention is also not as steep (18.1 percent vs. 20.4 percent) when days-to-turn is included. In other words, days-to-turn is an important vehicle characteristic that affects the transaction price, and aggregate price indexes that do not control for this characteristic imply a steeper drop in prices.
The pattern of days-to-turn over each model year and its demonstrated importance as a demand characteristic provide evidence that the sharp price declines occurring over each model
year are at least partially the result of a "depreciation effect." After controlling for a vehicle's physical characteristics, we find that the value of a vehicle declines the longer it sits on the dealer's lot. To illustrate this point, chart 9 graphs the average days-to-turn for all vehicles by model year. As can be seen in the chart, the average days-to-turn increases noticeably throughout the life cycle of a given model year, even before the end of a vehicle's production cycle (which takes place between the vertical bars).
Quality Adjustment Using Vehicle Cost
In an alternative set of regressions, we estimated hedonic price indexes using a reduced set of dummy variables that control for unique models, rather than model/years. This allowed us to include an explicit adjustment for quality using vehicle cost. Of course, vehicle cost is an imperfect measure of quality changes in that it also reflects any shocks that affect production costs. Among the 21,234 observations in the sample, there were 420 unique models. In addition to the dummy variables for each model, we added dummy variables for the 58 models that had been redesigned, so that they were essentially treated as different models from the model years before the redesign. The resulting indexes for the three price measures (before and after incentives) are shown in chart 10, along with the CPI for new vehicles. Although the index of price before incentives declines at a rate similar to the change in the CPI, the indexes of prices after incentives drop somewhat more steeply than the CPI; nonetheless, all of these indexes decrease much less sharply than the indexes based on model-year fixed effects and days-to-turn.
Conclusions
In recent years, and particularly since September 2001, marketing incentives have become an integral component to understanding movements in transaction prices for motor vehicles. The average value of cash rebates and interest subvention has increased dramatically, as has the share of transactions that included some form of incentive. In order to better understand the effects of these incentives on aggregate prices, we constructed several matchedmodel price indexes using a unique dataset that contains highly detailed price and quantity information. To our knowledge, this is the first work to examine the monthly pattern of prices using such detailed information.
We find that prices for vehicles of a given model year drop markedly, in large part through the use of incentives. By contrast, indexes of vehicle cost by model year remain relatively flat. We therefore test whether the drop in prices over the model year reflects differences in demand characteristics that change over time. In a hedonic price regression, we find that, after controlling for the fixed characteristics of each vehicle, days-to-turn is an important determinant of the transaction price. We interpret this result as evidence that new vehicles are subject to depreciation in the period of time between their arrival on dealer lots and when they are finally purchased. Note: Components may not sum to totals due to independent rounding. Exiting models are counted in month t+1, i.e., the period in which a match cannot be made. Total marketed is the sum of continuing plus entering models.
Source: Authors' database constructed from monthly data in J.D. Power and Associates' PIN Explorer Database. In the author's database, PIN transactions for a model in a month that preceded or trailed the primary selling period for the model by more than 3 months were not included. With days to turn 21,084 0.993 -18.1% -4.9% Source: Authors' database constructed from monthly data in J.D. Power and Associates' PIN Explorer Database. Note. The baseline regression includes dummy variables for each of the 1,650 model-year vehicles in the sample as well as a dummy variable for each time period. Q2   Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  1999  2000 
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